The US is once again ensuring extended deterrence, but that is coming with its own host of issues with Beijing and Pyongyang.

by Jae-Jung Suh, Responsible Statecraft

Can President Biden strengthen the extended deterrence over South Korea as he promised during his summit meeting with President Yoon Suk Yeol in April in a way that reduces the South’s interest in developing its own nuclear weapons without increasing the North’s arsenal?

Is it possible that the U.S. security commitment to defend its ally helps the United States focus on maintaining the peace and security of the status quo, thus perpetuating the Korean War that has been sustained with an armistice for 70 years, and now full of risks for escalation to nuclear exchanges with North Korea or for expansion to a new cold war?

In South Korea Official Dinner in honor of The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. President of the United States of America

While the Biden administration succeeded in crafting the Washington Declaration that helped quiet South Korean voices clamoring for their own nuclear weapons, its success only brought these challenging questions to the fore. Now it has to answer them as it implements the Declaration.

On July 18, the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a key component in the Washington Declaration designed to restore Seoul’s confidence in Washington’s commitment to extended deterrence, held its inaugural meeting in Seoul.

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