ACURA Symposium: Mr. President, Renew New START for the Sake of Peace.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his desire to extend the treaty, it is possible that Trump is being influenced by a coterie of neoconservatives to hold off on extending New START.

By Various Authors, American Committee for US-Russia Accord

The New START Treaty expires on February 5th. 

As of this writing, little is known about the Trump administration’s intentions with regard to renewing the treaty. 

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his desire to extend the treaty, it is possible that Trump is being influenced by a coterie of neoconservatives to hold off on extending New START. 

Meanwhile, the usual chorus of unreconstructed hawks who staff most of DC’s think tanks are urging the administration to hold off, as it would be seen as a “reward” to Vladimir Putin. 

Others claim extending New START is contrary to US national security interests.

We believe this line of thinking is both short-sighted and dangerous. In order to draw public (and hopefully Congressional) attention to the risks involved of not renewing, we present the following contributions from experts in arms control, international relations, and US-Russian affairs who believe the Trump administration ought to renew New START.

—Katrina vanden Hevel and James W. Carden for ACURA

Emma Claire Foley is Campaign Director of Defuse Nuclear War at RootsAction.

U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are already more than capable of destroying civilization as we know it. Mainstream policy discourse around the U.S. nuclear arsenal has largely been captured by a basic assumption that more nuclear weapons are better, an approach that relies on unrealistic assumptions of control, restraint, and perfect knowledge in a scenario where nuclear weapons are used.

Many such analyses assume that political problems can be effectively addressed with military solutions, and that diplomacy is somehow a weakness. It favors instead keeping the United States on the brink of conflict with Russia and China as the only way to prevent conflict from occurring.

And, as the fate of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program suggests, it’s very possible for the nuclear weapons policymaking process to produce weapons that lack a clear strategic purpose in anyone’s mind. Without New START, there will be one fewer check on the many factors that drive the continued development of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Criticism of the treaty frequently focuses on the need instead for arms control negotiations including the U.S., China, and Russia. These three countries should indeed take steps toward trilateral arms-control negotiations. Yet such negotiations would require tremendous work as well as policy sacrifices from the United States that are not forthcoming. Extending the treaty is a relatively easy, mutually beneficial step well within the Trump administration’s demonstrated capabilities that would help maintain a marginally safer status quo than what would exist without the treaty.

Those who advocate allowing the treaty to lapse and adopting still more aggressive nuclear weapons policies fatally underestimate the risk inherent to possessing nuclear weapons and keeping them ready to use. The road to a more peaceful order is walked with concrete steps toward limiting the potential for conflict, not endlessly pursuing global American military dominance.